George Wallace's presidential campaigns in 1968 and 1972

George Wallace’s disruptive presidential campaigns: 1968 vs. 1972

George C. Wallace, the former governor of Alabama, was a singular force in American politics during the volatile era of the late 1960s and early 1970s. His runs for the presidency in 1968 and 1972 reflected not only his unique appeal but also the deep fractures running through American society. Though both campaigns were fueled by populist rhetoric, racial grievance, and anti-elite sentiment, the differences in strategy, structure, and outcome were significant. In 1968, Wallace disrupted the general election as a third-party candidate, drawing significant support from white working-class voters and threatening the two-party system. In 1972, he competed within the Democratic primaries and, before an assassination attempt halted his campaign, was a formidable contender. Each campaign reshaped the political landscape in its own way.

Wallace in 1968: The outsider disruptor



In 1968, Wallace ran as the candidate of the American Independent Party, a third-party effort grounded in Southern populism, segregationist rhetoric, and anti-establishment fervor. His campaign emerged amid a chaotic national backdrop: the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy, widespread riots, the Vietnam War, and President Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to seek reelection. The major party candidates - Republican Richard Nixon and Democrat Hubert Humphrey - were seen by many as uninspiring or compromised. Wallace capitalized on this discontent.



Wallace’s core message was blunt and inflammatory. He championed "law and order," opposed federal intervention in states’ rights (particularly around civil rights issues), and mocked liberal intellectuals. He often said what others wouldn’t. His appeal was strongest among white working-class voters - many of them traditionally Democratic - who were disillusioned by civil rights reforms, urban unrest, and the anti-war movement.



Wallace's disruption was tangible. He won five Southern states (Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, and Arkansas), took 13.5% of the national vote (close to 10 million votes), and carried 46 electoral votes - still the most successful third-party presidential run since Theodore Roosevelt in 1912. Wallace pulled voters from both Nixon and Humphrey. His campaign likely drew more from the traditional Democratic base, particularly white Southerners who might otherwise have voted for Humphrey, but his anti-liberal rhetoric also appealed to some disaffected Republicans. Nixon feared a scenario where Wallace would deny both major candidates a majority in the Electoral College, throwing the election to the House of Representatives. This very real possibility put Wallace at the center of 1968’s political storm.





Wallace in 1972: A populist Democrat with momentum

By 1972, Wallace recalibrated. He entered the Democratic primaries as a registered Democrat rather than running third-party, aiming to be more than just a spoiler - he wanted to win the nomination. Though he remained a staunch segregationist in earlier years, Wallace began softening his rhetoric, subtly shifting from overt racism to a more coded form of populism. His message stayed rooted in economic grievance and cultural resentment: attacking “pointy-headed bureaucrats,” welfare programs, crime, and forced busing.

Wallace’s campaign struck a nerve. In the early 1972 primaries, he shocked the political establishment by winning over a broad swath of voters - not just in the South but also in Northern industrial states. He won convincingly in Florida with over 40% of the vote and performed strongly in Michigan, Indiana, Tennessee, and North Carolina. In the Michigan primary, he came in a strong second, just behind the liberal favorite George McGovern, a U.S. Senator from South Dakota, and beat other mainstream candidates like Hubert Humphrey. His support was strongest among working-class whites, union members, and voters angry at the pace of social change.

Then came the turning point: on May 15, 1972, Wallace was shot five times by Arthur Bremer, a native of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, while Wallace was on the campaign trail making an appearance at a shopping center in Laurel, Maryland. The shooting left Wallace permanently paralyzed from the waist down and ended his campaign’s momentum. Though he continued to appear on ballots and even won some late primaries (Maryland and Michigan), his physical incapacity and the media's focus on his recovery overshadowed any further serious campaigning. More crucially, Democratic Party elites, who had already been wary of Wallace's divisive appeal, turned away entirely.



Did the shooting cost Wallace the Democratic nomination in 1972?

It's unlikely that George Wallace would have won the 1972 Democratic nomination, even had he not been shot. The Democratic Party’s national structure - dominated by liberals and union leadership - viewed Wallace as a threat to party unity and electability. The eventual nominee, George McGovern, represented the opposite end of the party’s ideological spectrum: anti-war, pro-civil rights, and socially liberal.

However, Wallace was on track to gather a substantial number of delegates, and with the Democratic primary field deeply fractured (including McGovern, Humphrey, Scoop Jackson, and others), he might have been able to broker significant influence at the convention. He could have served as a kingmaker - or at least shaped the party’s message toward more conservative or populist tones. The shooting removed that possibility.



The attack also froze Wallace’s public image in a moment of sympathy. While it didn't erase his segregationist past, it added a layer of martyrdom among his followers and gave him national attention as a victim of political violence. It arguably set the stage for his later political rehabilitation in Alabama, where he was re-elected governor in 1974 and eventually renounced his earlier racist positions.

If Wallace had in fact been the Democratic nominee in the 1972 presidential election, he could have significantly reshaped the conservative vote - and possibly siphoned off a portion of Richard Nixon’s base.



Wallace’s appeal to working-class white voters, particularly in the South and among the “silent majority,” overlapped with key parts of Nixon’s support. His populist rhetoric, strong law-and-order stance, and fierce opposition to desegregation and federal overreach resonated with voters who were wary of social change and skeptical of government. These were the same voters Nixon targeted with his “Southern Strategy” and themes of stability and traditional values. Wallace may have also gained significant traction in Rust Belt states with his anti-elitist, pro-working class platform.

In short, Wallace on the Democratic ticket would have posed a serious threat to Nixon's ability to dominate the conservative electorate. While Wallace’s extreme positions may have alienated moderates and liberals, his presence could have fractured the right-leaning vote, tightening what was otherwise a Nixon landslide in 1972. The actual Democratic Party nominee that year, McGovern, only carried Massachusetts and the District of Columbia in the general election against Nixon.



Conclusion

George Wallace was one of the most polarizing and consequential figures in late 20th-century American politics. His 1968 third-party run demonstrated how a populist outsider could disrupt a national election by appealing to cultural and racial resentment. In 1972, he showed he could command serious influence within the Democratic Party, especially among disaffected working-class voters. The assassination attempt cut that campaign short, ending what could have been a more prolonged battle for the soul of the Democratic Party.

Wallace’s legacy is mixed and complicated. He did not win the presidency, but his blend of populist messaging, coded racial appeals, and anti-establishment anger laid groundwork for future political figures - on both the right and left - who would channel similar frustrations. His 1968 and 1972 campaigns were not only about electoral math but about the changing identity of American politics.